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中国DOS联盟论坛 » 其它操作系统综合讨论区 » The Manifesto of Internet Communism [Repost] StickyI View 13,099 Replies 9
Original Poster Posted 2002-12-02 00:00 ·  中国 广东 河源 连平县 电信
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The Communist Manifesto of the Internet (The Cybercommunist Manifesto)
Author: Unknown

Are free software developers subverting capitalism and the market economy with their free code?
Richard Barbook's recent manifesto "Cybercommunism" argues that those hackers who contribute their development results to the Internet for free are "superseding capitalism" and "successfully building a future utopia in the present, just as predicted by Karl Marx".

Marx may not have thought of the gift economy brought by high technology. One core of "Cybercommunism" is: a community of hackers (referring to developers) who can afford to give their labor results for free are building an exchange system to replace the market economy that is about to be irreversibly eliminated.

And it's not only those free software hackers participating in this new economy who are doing this. In fact, all of us participating in online activities are involved.

"On the Internet, working together by contributing gifts has been the daily work of thousands of people. Just like their work, individuals also collaborate in collaborative projects in their spare time. Getting out of the immediate principles of the market, work can increasingly become a gift-like giving. There is no need for a few highly talented people to lead everyone into the future." Barbrook wrote, "Every day, they are sending emails, participating in discussions, making websites, and contributing to newsgroups. Since there is no need to sell information as a commodity, they spontaneously work together by passing gifts (referring to contributions)."

In 1996, Barbrook, a left-wing sociologist at the University of Westminster in the UK, published an article on "Net-Consciousness" - "The California Ideology" - a clear attack on the right-wing liberal digital elite's occupation of the Internet. This article later received strong rebuttals from Louis Rossetto of Wired magazine (who called Barbrook "out to lunch", "utterly laughable" and "anal retentive". This essay still represents one of the most profound criticisms of the new conservative digital hypersterism.

Based on the success of Linux and other free software flag-bearers, Barbrook implies that "transmitting information in the form of gifts is not only acceptable but also more efficient than commodity exchange". Those who hope to make a profit from their software must learn how to embrace the gift economy, otherwise, as Lenin said, they are doomed to be "the dustbin of history".

The market economy is very concerned about those programmers who can prove their strength in free software. The high stock value of Redhat also proves that Wall Street has not yet felt the fear brought by the danger of capitalism being overthrown. So the fear that free software such as GPL will bring about a decline in profits in the software industry is exaggerated.

But strange things are going on. As Barbrook observed, Karl Marx predicted that "sooner or later, the development of productive forces will democratize the relations of production". In other words, the success of capitalism itself has produced a class of people (free software hackers) and an infrastructure (the Internet), and both factors are unfolding and promoting a successful subversion movement of capitalism. What does it matter if the Soviet Union has fallen? Capitalism itself may be its biggest enemy.

References:

CYBER-COMMUNISM: how the Americans are superseding capitalism in cyberspace
我完全同意设想建立DOS组织“DOS联盟” ,也就是说和Wengier、以及“起步”站长莫老师等DOS战友一起来建立这个“DOS联盟”,以发展我国自主OS(操作系统)的高度去完成我们共同的愿望。
------党委书记
Floor 2 Posted 2002-12-02 00:00 ·  中国 广东 河源 连平县 电信
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Linus Torvalds
Translation: Axis (Xia Hao)*

1. Linus and Bill

Almost overnight, this name suddenly became as widely known as Bill Gates. But Bill Gates, no matter how many countless millions of dollars he may be worth, will never become Linus Torvalds. This 29-year-old Finn, the creator of the simple yet powerful Linux operating system, has gone beyond the Gates myth. There are also rumors that Gates is an outstanding programmer, but Linus is the real thing. While still in college he completed a genuine operating system. The young Gates called fellow programmers who copied his own mediocre programs “thieves,” while the generous Linus shared his masterpiece with the whole world. Which man, which movement wins, may decide the future of technological development.

Two years ago, if anyone had said that the technology giant and close Microsoft partner HP would be busy making sure the computers it produced could run Linux smoothly, it would have sounded like fantasy. But the development model Linus adopted, inviting the whole world to share and improve his personal original work, sparked a revolution. Skeptics felt that Microsoft, faced with the U.S. Department of Justice lawsuit, was only labeling Linux a serious competitor in order to manufacture an imaginary enemy and wash away the charge of monopoly. But the truth Microsoft let slip may have been more than they intended. At the end of last year, an internal Microsoft white paper called the “Halloween Documents” leaked to the press, and its conclusions might well keep Gates awake at night.

Linus is regarded by many as the best representative of open source software (open source software), and Microsoft’s traditional way of dealing with competitors probably has no effect on him. “Linux and other open source software are increasingly proving credibly that OSS is at least as robust as commercial software, if not beyond it.” So wrote Microsoft engineer Vinod Valloppillil in the white paper: “The ability of OSS to gather and exploit the collective intelligence of thousands on the Internet is simply amazing.”

But what the “Halloween Documents” did not mention is that Linus has already proved himself the smartest and most powerful of the many anti-Gates figures. Oracle CEO Larry Ellison’s NC offensive was only a passing cloud; Sun CEO Scott McNealy, despite his great success with JAVA, seems to have become bogged down in unconditional opposition to Gates; by contrast, Linus has never strayed from his own path. Though he himself would never admit it, you could say he is a smooth and seasoned politician. He avoided the confrontation between pure free-software supporters and profit-seeking new vendors that could have shattered Linux into pieces. He welcomes all commercial Linux versions and commercial Linux software that can improve the software’s reliability and usability, and still spares no effort in supporting the free software radicals who helped open the way with him.

Hard to believe, in this age of IPOs and nonstop high-tech billionaires, Linus does not seem eager to cash out his success. He still drives the Pontiac Grand Am he bought in early 1997 when he left Finland and started his first job in America (also his only job so far—this is Silicon Valley, after all). A year ago, when that little apartment in Santa Clara could no longer hold Linus, his kindergarten-teacher wife, and their two daughters, they rented the first house they looked at—right across the street. All kinds of rumors about his employer, the highly secretive Transmeta, are making a huge stir in Silicon Valley, but so far Linus shows no sign of suddenly making a fortune.

Face to face, the man most people simply call Linus wears glasses, speaks softly, is approachable, proud of his talent and achievements, and very humorous. He used to be famous for eating whatever was in front of him, but now he has a special fondness for sushi. Because of all the programming, his belly sticks out a bit, but neither his voice nor his mischievous smile has lost that Finnish lightness.

Linus seems to be a populist, hoping to break the monopolistic way of thinking about software pricing, and this is reflected in his other tastes as well. For example, he doesn’t buy hardcover books, because he believes hardcover books don’t sell all that well, so they must be overpriced. Likewise, he prefers entertaining Hollywood movies to highbrow European art films. His father works in radio, his mother translates newspaper news, an uncle works for Finnish television, and his grandfather is a newspaper reporter, so he understands the news media, and seems quite pleased with his growing fame.
2. Rebellious, rebellious
Question: Do you consider yourself a traditional hacker in the positive sense, a rebel? I feel simply calling you “a programmer obsessed with programming” is not enough.

Answer: I generally try to avoid using the word hacker. In private conversations with other technical people, I do call myself a hacker. But when dealing with the media I just say “programmer” or something like that, because now hacker often means something else.

Question: Then what about the label “rebel”?

Answer: “Rebel” implies you are fighting for some cause and against something else. I wouldn’t say I’m a rebel, I’d say I’m principled. (ethical instead of rebel) The basic meaning of rebellion is opposition, while I feel I have my own goals—that’s the difference. I have my own principles. I don’t care whether others believe in them too; I think that is entirely a personal choice.

Question: Then how would you describe your principles and goals?

Answer: My basic principle for life is: “Do unto others as you would not have done unto yourself.” This is not just a Christian idea, it is universal. It’s a very simple rule, and in the vast majority of cases it tells you what to do. If you’re hesitating—“What should I do?”—you can ask yourself, “What would I want him or her to do?” Then you know the answer immediately.

Question: Do you believe there is some social or political element in your work or in your technology?

Answer: Not from the beginning. At first it had nothing to do with society; the original motivation was technical and personal interest. There was no politics in it because politics, by nature, is about changing people’s minds, and I’ve always disliked having that happen to me.

But many other “open source” people may not think the same way I do. Many of them are political: some people try to make others accept their views, and I don’t want to do that. I’ll talk about my views too, but only after someone asks me.

Question: There were many chances for you to go into business, or to decide that the Linux operating system should be commercialized, but clearly you didn’t do that, and that surprises me. Why?

Answer: It’s a matter of personal interest. What attracted me to Linux has always been the technology. It wasn’t started to make money, and even when it became possible to make money, that still wasn’t my original intention. Commercialization would change my motivation.

I’m very happy that some people make money from Linux. That adds depth to Linux and brings in new motivations and new factors, things that would be impossible without commercial goals. But when I started Linux, commercialization was not my choice.

Question: Many people would think that was a difficult choice. But you seem perfectly at ease with it. Why do you think that is?

Answer: Maybe in America it’s a difficult choice, but not necessarily in many other parts of the world. America is money-centered, everyone values money, and of course that has its advantages.

But Finland is different. In that cultural setting, success is admired, but other things are valued too, maybe even more. For example, my family places great importance on degrees. They think learning is important; they don’t care that much about money.

3. Linus 2.0
Question: There’s a heavy cloud of mystery around your work at Transmeta. Can you give me any hint about when the truth might come out?

Answer: No. Maybe tomorrow, maybe in 15 years.

Question: Did Transmeta come looking for you, or did you go looking for Transmeta?

Answer: It was a two-way choice. I knew a Swede who worked at Transmeta. He spent a day in Helsinki and met with me, and at that time I said, “At last I can graduate,” because by then I hadn’t had a real break in years. Then he asked whether I wanted to go to Transmeta, and then I talked with his boss. A week later, in the fall of 1996, I was on a plane to California to take a look.

Question: I understand you can’t reveal work-related things, but can you tell me what excites you about this job?

Answer: Partly because by then I had already spent six years on Linux and wanted something else too. I didn’t want to hang myself on a single rope. I didn’t want Linux to be my whole life; I wanted to find something motivating in itself. Also, small companies feel more human. And it’s exciting to get involved in areas where nobody else in the world is involved.

Question: Those things have nothing to do with Linux, right?

Answer: Internally they use Linux. I use it every day. They also welcome the work I do on Linux. Partly because of the PR effect, partly because they can use it internally too.

Question: But your work on Linux is unpaid. Many people wonder how you can spend so much time on something that brings in no money...

Answer: Even for those who can’t imagine that anyone in the world might do things out of interest—and that’s kind of sad, but such people do exist—I can explain it this way: if Linux really goes smoothly for 10 years, then I’ll be able to get whatever I want, like putting money in the bank. That’s not my purpose, but you can explain it that way to people who otherwise can’t understand.

I think of myself as an artist, doing what I want to do. And it’s not as if I have to live miserably, because programmers are treated pretty well.

4. Time is everything
Question: Your views on capitalism are interesting. It seems you also believe in some of the ideas of free software, but you’re not against charging for software and services. In what cases is charging more reasonable, and in what cases is free more reasonable?

Answer: Charging is always reasonable. But when I started, I couldn’t use commercial software, because it was too expensive. One reason Linux exists is that I didn’t want anyone else to end up in that situation again—that’s “Do unto others as you would not have done unto yourself.” But at the same time I don’t think taking money is wrong.

I’m not against money. Money is an interesting concept, but you have to choose what matters most. The good thing about Linux is that if you’re a company willing to pay for 365 days a year, 24 hours a day service, then you’ll have to pay a lot of money—even on Linux that’s expensive—but if you’re a poor student, or in a third-world country, maybe Linux will give you a chance to encounter some new things.

Question: Did the speed of Linux’s development or the direction it took ever surprise you?

Answer: What happened last year had been brewing for some time. In a way, when one company decides to support Linux, it is surprising that so many others then respond. But I’ve never sat at home grinning ear to ear, unable to say anything but “wow”; my reaction is more like, “Hmm, pretty cool, it really happened.”

Question: Can it be said that Linux caught the timing well?

Answer: Linux’s success is a combination of timing, demand, and market opportunity. For example, when Linux was first being developed, people didn’t have CDROMs. A year after Linux appeared, CDROMs were everywhere, so suddenly there was a possibility of commercial Linux distributions with high performance-price value. So yes, the timing was very good. The Internet was also a great opportunity. Linux already existed before the Internet became popular, but once the network infrastructure was in place, Linux definitely benefited from it to one degree or another.

Question: I also feel that, judging from the way things developed on Microsoft’s side, Linux appeared at just the right time.

Answer: For PR reasons, the Justice Department lawsuit became a big anti-Microsoft gathering. Two years ago, nobody questioned Microsoft; everyone thought what Microsoft did was only natural. People worshipped Microsoft: big company, successful, making loads of money, and people thought that was the American dream. One result of the Justice Department lawsuit is that some people who used to like Microsoft have now changed their minds.

5. Open source is democracy
Question: And now they also know there are choices other than Microsoft?

Answer: The fact you mention means that suddenly you begin to notice there are other choices. Before, people weren’t looking for alternatives. Now, even if you don’t switch from Windows to Linux, or make any other big change, you still say: “Looks like what Microsoft says needs to be thought about.” I think that is important.

6. Open vs. closed
Question: How would you compare your open source way of developing Linux with Microsoft’s closed way of developing Windows and Windows NT?

Answer: With Linux, users of the system can influence the direction of development. From the standpoint that users do not have to give up control, that is democracy. Everyone can do anything. Of course, the basic premise is that you must have enough ability, but that’s also a good way to distinguish those who do the work from those who don’t. And even those who don’t modify the software can still make suggestions, do testing, and so on.

I think open source is quite superior as a development model—especially compared with the traditional commercial closed development environment. The essence of the problem is how to motivate people to create.

But there is indeed a lot of work that simply can’t be called interesting. If a job is not interesting, there have to be other incentives. The most obvious one is money. To some extent, it is easier to make money in a closed environment. The closed model relies on not providing others with complete information, thus limiting competition. Limiting competition is beneficial to companies.

Question: Do you have any metaphor to describe the difference between the two models?

Answer: I’d put it this way: the closed model is a publishing house that controls movable type rather than language. Users have the freedom to read and the freedom to write, but the publisher decides what kind of things can be published, distributed, and passed down. You can read, and you can handwrite, but if you want to improve a book, you either have to start over from scratch or ask the publisher.

Question: Then the metaphor for the open source model should be a printer—the printer restricts nothing.

Answer: Right, you can have as many printers as you like, and printers can share fonts.

Question: That’s an interesting metaphor. Why have Linux and the open source model been so successful? Can you tell me what you think?

Answer: One reason Linux has come this far is that it is the weaker side. To some extent, the forces of the market don’t mean that much to Linux developers. People develop Linux because the things they are interested in don’t get enough market share, and because they don’t have some board of directors behind them requiring a financial explanation every quarter.

You change the rules of the game, and in doing so you also change the market. (You also change the market by changing the rules in ways that Microsoft isn't willing to fail on) Open source availability became a selling point. Suddenly there was a new rule of the game. Not everyone cares about that rule, but as long as some people do, they will reject Microsoft without a second thought. It’s just like two armies facing off: you can’t let the enemy choose the battlefield, you have to seize the initiative.

Question: Do you think Linux might force Microsoft or other mainstream vendors to change their strategy or their battlefield?

Answer: To some extent I hope so. Let me explain with a metaphor I think is appropriate: let’s look at the five biggest software companies in America today, and compare them to the five biggest American car manufacturers in the 1950s. Back then all the car companies competed on new features and accessories, putting out new models every year.

Sound familiar? Now every year there’s a new version of Windows. Back then the job of the car companies was to get people to pay attention to each year’s model update. So the 1951 Cadillac and the 1952 Cadillac were very different. Naturally people would pay attention to model year. Why? Because the companies wanted people to care what model they drove, what year it was—the new year’s new model would bring them huge profits. Even though last year’s model still worked perfectly well, the companies still wanted to sell the new one.

Linux and I are like the Japanese car industry back then. Sure, historically there was the oil crisis of the 1970s and other factors. But the essence of the problem was that the American car industry didn’t care about quality, only about new features and yearly new models. Then Japanese cars appeared. At first they had quality, though not necessarily much fame, but gradually users realized: “Hey, Japanese cars are just well built. They may not have tailfins, but really, why should I change cars every year?”

I believe that is an accurate metaphor. If Microsoft can change the way it works the way the American car industry did, I would be very happy. If Microsoft really can change and compete with Linux on quality, that would be my victory.

Question: Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer (the number-two man) recently mentioned opening Windows source code. What do you think of that?

Answer: All my development work is done on the Internet, and the first thing you learn on the Internet is that talk is cheap. (and the first thing you learn on the Internet is that talk is cheap.) Unless I see results, I don’t believe any words, and that applies to everything, including what Ballmer says. Seeing is believing. (Show me the money!)

7. Linux vs. NT
Question: Speaking of Ballmer and his real intentions, do you think Microsoft is genuinely afraid of Linux, or is it just using media hype to deal with the Justice Department lawsuit?

Answer: I believe at first it was a deliberate move by Microsoft, especially last autumn when Linux had just started attracting attention. Nobody inside Microsoft would have taken Linux that seriously, but they saw that it could be used as an argument in court. But they miscalculated: the result was that a lot of people in the media became interested—“What exactly is this Linux?”

Question: Do you think Linux could become more widely used than NT?

Answer: If we are only comparing Linux and NT, then my answer is yes. Windows NT and Linux have roughly similar market share. In the future Linux will surpass NT. When that day comes I won’t be too surprised. The real goal is the desktop system. That won’t happen in one or two years, but maybe in 3, 4, or 5 years.

Question: Do you think within two to three years Linux will challenge Microsoft’s position in the desktop market?

Answer: Three to four years. I hope that by then Linux will be one of the choices for non-technical computer users.

Question: And what effect would that have on the computer industry and on Microsoft?

Answer: It may not go that far. I just think a market where users have no choice is unhealthy.

Question: You use the word unhealthy?

Answer: Yes, unhealthy. You have a very broad and complex market, but one company controls most of it. But in the end, monopolies cannot last.

In emerging markets, one company often holds enormous power. The oil kings of the past did; the auto industry of the past did; the computer industry of the past did too, when people thought IBM was unbeatable. In the end it always develops into a situation where five or six big companies stand side by side, and that is what is stable. So I think the current market is unhealthy.

8. The road over the next 5 years
Question: What do you think about the conflict between free software and commercial forces? Some purists dislike Redhat or any other company selling commercial Linux versions; they think Linux should remain free forever.

Answer: I try to avoid seeing things as only black and white. My view is: with Linux, you really can avoid commercialization. You can download everything you need from the net and not pay a cent. But frankly, I don’t want to download everything anymore. Now, if I have a new machine, I’ll put in a Redhat or Suse CD, install it, and then add the other things I need myself. I don’t have to pay for the CD, but if necessary, I’m willing to pay. They really do provide a real service. That’s choice. If you insist on seeing things as black and white, and think Linux should be completely free, then that too is your choice, but I think it limits you.

Question: It seems you’re not worried that Redhat and companies like that might manipulate Linux?

Answer: That’s because companies like Redhat won’t want to take over kernel development—they understand what that would cost. They will want many kernel developers among their employees, so that if problems arise, their own people can handle them.

But they themselves don’t want to get into kernel development. A decent commercial company will always spend time on market research, figure out what customers are doing, what additional features or value can be brought to users, make sure the product is easy to install, and fix important small holes. The key is the finished product—finishing a product, and marketing and organizational operation. (It's about finishing touches, and it's marketing and logistics.)

Question: What do you think Linux will become in 5 years?

Answer: To me, the most interesting thing has always been its wide variety of uses. I’m interested in the embedded market, because there you get special uses you won’t find elsewhere. From a technical perspective, supercomputers are always sexy, but on the other hand they’re also interesting because they have special requirements you won’t find elsewhere.

I think the most interesting market is the desktop market, because the desktop has no specialization at all. And in turn that means there will never be one perfect solution—people need too many different things. Technically, this is an extremely difficult problem, and that’s why I pay special attention to the desktop. I hope that within 5 years you will see Linux become one choice for desktop systems. Maybe it won’t replace Microsoft, but at least it will become a real choice. When someone goes to a computer store in 2004 to buy his first computer, he will stop and think for a moment whether he wants Linux, Windows, or MacOS.

Question: Linux and the open source model seem to work very well. Are there any other new business models that interest you?

Answer: There is one that interests me but doesn’t convince me: the “Internet phrasing” business model, which consists of putting an E- in front of a company name and then inflating the stock market value by an order of magnitude. I find that interesting, but in the long run it won’t succeed.

Question: Then what do you think will happen?

Answer: I think traditional industries will take the Internet very seriously. A small number of companies out in front will become famous in one stroke and then do well; among the rest, maybe not even one out of ten will have a chance of success. Maybe Yahoo will survive—it has such a great name that it can make money from the name alone—brand recognition is still very important. But they won’t make money through their present business model; maybe they already understand that themselves.

Question: One last question: what do you think will happen to software product prices?

Answer: Back then PC companies and Microsoft entered a market where software was generally expensive by making cheap software. Look at those small but aggressive companies—for example Borland, now called Inprise, which became famous through compilers, or Microsoft, through BASIC—that’s how they entered the market. What is frustrating is that now Microsoft has such a firm grip on the market that a new round of price increases has begun. Inprise caused a sensation back then by being the first to introduce a compiler priced under 100 dollars, but that sensation has been forgotten. We are back to an era of high software prices, because once again big companies can say, “This is how much you ought to pay.”

I hope we will have another sensation like that. The present economic model allows software to be sold at high prices, but I believe that won’t last. This makes some people think I’m a communist, but I’m not—I absolutely believe in competition. I just believe competition will win, and prices will fall again.
我完全同意设想建立DOS组织“DOS联盟” ,也就是说和Wengier、以及“起步”站长莫老师等DOS战友一起来建立这个“DOS联盟”,以发展我国自主OS(操作系统)的高度去完成我们共同的愿望。
------党委书记
Floor 3 Posted 2002-12-02 00:00 ·  中国 广东 河源 连平县 电信
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FreeBSD - Another Path to Free Software

Author: Boston Globe

Translation: Unauthorized

Linus Torvalds strode to the podium, his kind eyes unperturbed by the numerous flashing lights. He was late for the press conference. He had to show his kids the penguin - the logo of the software that made him famous.

Torvalds is the god of the program, a young man from Finland, leading the development of Linux, an operating system bearing his name. As the penguin logo of Linux spread all over the Internet, many famous computing companies invested millions of dollars in Linux, and Torvalds is now a software wizard loved by everyone.

Meanwhile, at the LinuxWorld exhibition, Jordan Hubbard sat at a booth piled with CD-ROMs, books, and a toy of a happy monster, but there were not many reporters around. Many visitors to the exhibition recognized the happy monster logo and the company it represented: FreeBSD Inc. Even so, most of the glory at LinuxWorld passed him by. Hubbard didn't painstakingly admit the fact: "We failed on the PR (public relations) battlefield"

Devils vs. Penguins
You can call FreeBSD another Linux. Like Linux, FreeBSD is an operating system developed in the 1970s according to the model of Unix (a powerful and complex system developed by AT&T). As its name implies, FreeBSD can be obtained for free by downloading from the Internet, and like Linux, it can get "source code", so people can modify it until they think it meets their requirements. Many of the largest Internet sites such as Yahoo use FreeBSD to run their network systems. The same is true for the FAST search engine in Waltham, the world's largest engine with 200 million Web page information.

BSD stands for Berkeley System Distribution, a Unix system developed by the University of California at Berkeley. In 1991, some Berkeley developers decided to sell a version of Unix that could run on desktop systems. They initially called it BSDI and had a free phone - 1-800-ITS-UNIX. "This really made AT&T's shorts on fire," Hubbard said.

AT&T sued, and the development of BSD withered. But in the meantime, Hubbard and some others began to develop a new BSD that could be freely distributed and give everyone who needed it all the source code. FreeBSD first appeared at the end of 1993, almost at the same time as the start of Linux. But there were no legal problems in the Linux camp, and programmers around the world were hesitant about accepting this open program plan that might be sued for infringement. Even after the legal problems were resolved after 1994, FreeBSD couldn't regain the lost momentum.

"We were the snobs" - We were the snobs
There was another problem in the world view of BSD people. They are super smart technical giants from one of the best universities in the world. They knew they could write better code than the common people scattered all over the world. So the people of FreeBSD didn't provide help to those interested outsiders. "We were the snobs," Hubbard said. "We were the ones who wouldn't let anyone modify the core content of the program."

Hubbard insisted that the result of doing so was cleaner and more compact code. Eric Raymond - a saint advocating the open software movement - said that the development model of Linux produced a legion of users and enthusiasts around the world. This may not be the most efficient way to develop an operating system, but it ensures that the completed product will have a stable market. FreeBSD has a separate group of programmers, and this is exactly what has greatly hurt itself. "BSD people have many advantages," Raymond said, but "they did one thing wrong and ruined all other advantages. Their sociology (viewpoint) was wrong!"

Future historians may forget that Torvalds wrote parts of Linux. But they will remember the collaborative work of part-time programmers from a worldwide group, and all these efforts finally resulted in a product, although this product still has many remaining immaturities. The collaboration itself is a miracle of the manifestation of power.

Meanwhile, Hubbard said that the times are favorable for FreeBSD. The success of Linux is continuously attracting new users. As Linux is opening a path for Free Software, FreeBSD is happy to be a follower. "We are letting them first walk out of 8 feet of snow," Hubbard said. The penguin seems to be better at this aspect than the monster.
我完全同意设想建立DOS组织“DOS联盟” ,也就是说和Wengier、以及“起步”站长莫老师等DOS战友一起来建立这个“DOS联盟”,以发展我国自主OS(操作系统)的高度去完成我们共同的愿望。
------党委书记
Floor 4 Posted 2002-12-02 00:00 ·  中国 广东 河源 连平县 电信
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The Struggle for Free Software Is Far from Over

Richard Stallman: Pioneer of Free Software:

In 1984, Richard Stallman left MIT to start developing a Unix-like free software operating system. Since then, he founded the Free Software Foundation, developed the General Public License (GPL), and personally wrote a significant amount of the original code that now constitutes the GNU/Linux operating system. Many people simply call it the Linux operating system, following Linus Torvalds (who began writing the Linux Kernel in 1991 and incorporated GNU software and other free software).

Today, Richard Stallman is an extremely active advocate for the free software cause.

What are the main issues facing the current free software movement?

In general, they must protect the areas where we have already achieved freedom and expand into the areas where victory has not yet been won. The most prominent of these areas are the device drivers for newly emerging hardware devices. Because hardware manufacturers do not disclose their technical specifications and parameters, it is difficult to develop free software that runs on these new devices.

What is the threat?

The threat is that people will become content with non-free device drivers. Linus has decided to allow non-free drivers to dynamically link with the Linux Kernel. This means the emergence of non-free driver software in Linux and free software.

Does this conform to the GPL?

This is inconsistent with the GPL as I understand it, but Linus is in charge of Linux, so if he thinks it's okay, no one can say no. So hardware manufacturers can not disclose their parameters, and we will lose some of our freedom.

What we can do is not to buy hardware that requires non-free software. This is something each of us can do. In addition, some of us must figure out how they work and write free software drivers.

The more we can realize that free software is a free cause, the more willing we will be to投身于 this cause.
我完全同意设想建立DOS组织“DOS联盟” ,也就是说和Wengier、以及“起步”站长莫老师等DOS战友一起来建立这个“DOS联盟”,以发展我国自主OS(操作系统)的高度去完成我们共同的愿望。
------党委书记
Floor 5 Posted 2002-12-02 00:00 ·  中国 广东 河源 连平县 电信
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The Magic Cauldron - An Analysis of the Economic Background of Open Source



This article is translated from The Magic Cauldron, by Eric S. Raymond, June 1999

This is the third essay in famous open source advocate Eric S. Raymond’s open source series; the first two were “The Cathedral and the Bazaar” and “Homesteading the Noosphere.”

Either the ideas in the original are too complicated and jump too quickly, or my English isn’t good enough, or my Chinese isn’t good enough, or I still haven’t learned how to speak Chinese. This translation is a complete mess, all broken into pieces. But if you can still see something worthwhile in it, I’ll be very satisfied; if you can give me some advice, correct the passages I translated badly, or explain facts and parables I still don’t understand, I would be extremely grateful; if you have anything to say about open source, please join the discussion at forum.linux.net.cn as well.



The Magic Cauldron — An Analysis of the Economic Background of Open Source
Original author: Eric S. Raymond, June 1999

Abstract

This article analyzes the changing economic foundation behind the open source phenomenon. The author first demolishes some popular myths about investment in program development and the price structure of software, uses game theory to analyze the stability of open source cooperation, and introduces eight models for funding open source development, including two non-profit and six profit-making models. The author then introduces a qualitative theory to discuss when closed-source development is economically rational. After that the author examines some other new mechanisms, showing that a market for funding profit-making open source development is taking shape, and that earlier sponsorship systems and task markets are also reappearing. The article ends with some tentative predictions about the future.


Contents

1. No different from magic
2. Genius “geeks” and others
3. The manufacturing delusion
4. The myth that “information wants to be free”
5. The counterexample of the commons
6. Reasons for closed source
7. The use-value investment model
7.1 The Apache case: cost sharing
7.2 The Cisco case: risk spreading
8. Why the commodity-value view is problematic
9. Indirect commodity-value models
9.1 Loss leader / market position
9.2 Widget frosting
9.3 Give away the recipe, open a restaurant
9.4 Accessories and add-ons
9.5 Open the future, sell the present
9.6 Open software, sell the brand
9.7 Open software, sell the content
10. When to open, when to close
10.1 What is profit?
10.2 How do they interact?
10.3 Doom: a case analysis
10.4 Understanding the timing of opening
11. The business ecology of open source
12. Coping with success
13. The reappearance of open R&D and sponsorship
14. Toward the other shore
15. Conclusion: life after the revolution
16. Bibliography and acknowledgments
17. Appendix: Why closed-source drivers lead to financial losses for vendors
18. Revisions


1. No different from magic

In Welsh mythology, the goddess Ceridwen had a marvelous cauldron that could magically cook delicious food—through spells known only to the goddess. In modern science, Buckminster Fuller proposed “ephemeralization,” that is, as material resources in original designs are increasingly replaced by information content, technology becomes more and more effective, but also cheaper and cheaper. Arthur C. Clarke linked the two and proposed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”

To many people, the success of the open source community seems like unbelievable magic. High-quality software is produced “freely, for free,” and it all seems to work so naturally and well, yet it looks as though it should not be able to continue existing in the real world under competition and scarcity of resources. Where is the key? Is Ceridwen’s cauldron just a conjurer’s trick? If not, how does “ephemeralization” work here—what spell is the goddess chanting?

Can anyone provide background information on the goddess Ceridwen, Buckminster Fuller, and Arthur C. Clarke? Thanks.


2. Genius “geeks” and others

The history of open source culture clearly runs contrary to the assumptions of many people who know about software development without actually being part of it. “The Cathedral and the Bazaar” (“Cathedral”) described how decentralized cooperative software development effectively overturned Brooks’s Law and produced software projects of unprecedented reliability and quality. “Homesteading the Noosphere” (“Homesteading”) examined the social forces behind this “bazaar” model of development and argued that it cannot be best understood from the viewpoint of a traditional exchange economy, but should instead be understood in what anthropologists call a “gift culture,” where members display status by giving away the products of their labor rather than trading them. In this article we will continue the analysis in “Cathedral” and “Homesteading” into the fields of economics, game theory, and business models, starting by exposing some common myths about the economics of software products, and introducing new conceptual tools to help explain how the “gift culture” of open source developers exists within an exchange economy.

In order to focus our analytical effort on this main line and avoid discussing other aspects again, we first need to set aside (or at least temporarily ignore) the “gift culture” explanation. “Homesteading” pointed out that gift-culture behavior arises in an environment where the necessities of survival are already abundant and exchange activities are no longer so interesting; while that seems adequate as a psychological explanation of behavior, it is still insufficient as an explanation of the mixed economic environment most open source developers actually live in. For many of them, exchange activity has lost its attraction, but its economic constraints are still there; their behavior must still have some meaning in terms of a “material scarcity economy,” so that they can afford to continue supporting a gift culture.

Therefore, we will consider (entirely from within the realm of scarcity economics) the patterns of cooperation and exchange that sustain the existence of open source development. At the same time, we will answer in detail some practical questions, such as: “How do you make money from this?” However, first we will show that the pressure behind this question derives from the currently dominant economic model of software products, and that model in fact no longer fits the objective facts.

(One last note before beginning: the discussion and advocacy of open source development in this article should not be interpreted as an example showing that closed-source development is intrinsically wrong, nor as opposition to software intellectual property, nor as an altruistic appeal for “sharing.” Although such claims are still beloved by a minority of statements among open source developers, experience since “Cathedral” shows they are no longer necessary to continue discussing. A fully adequate discussion of open source development need only be built on its engineering and economic results—better quality, higher reliability, lower cost, and more choice.)

What exactly is Brooks’s Law? I hope someone can help explain it.


3. The manufacturing delusion

Before beginning, we need to note that, like any other tool or capital good, computer programs have two different kinds of economic value: use value and commodity value.

The use value of a program is its economic value as a tool; its commodity value is its value as a saleable product. (In professional economic terms, commodity value is the value of the final product, and use value is the value of an intermediate product.)

When most people try to think about the economics of software products, they tend to use a kind of “factory model,” based on the following assumptions:

1. Most developers’ time is paid for by commodity value.

2. The commodity value of software is proportional to its development cost (that is, the cost in resources required to reproduce its functionality), and therefore also proportional to its use value.

In other words, people are very inclined to think that software has the same value characteristics as other typical manufactured goods. But both assumptions can be shown to be false.

First, code written for sale is only the tip of the iceberg of programming activity. In the pre-microcomputer era, it was very common that more than 90% of code was written internally by banks and insurance companies. This may no longer be quite so true now—other industries also rely far more heavily on software, so finance occupies a correspondingly smaller share—but as we shall soon see, empirical evidence still suggests that about 95% of code is written internally by companies.

This code includes most management information systems (MIS), the custom financial and database software every medium and large company needs, specialized technical code such as device drivers (almost nobody makes money by selling device drivers; we will return to this later), and the embedded code in the increasing number of microprocessor-controlled devices around us, from machine tools and jet aircraft to cars, microwave ovens, and electric ovens.

Most such internal code is integrated into its application environment in such a way that copying or reusing it is very difficult. (This is true whether the “environment” is a complete set of procedures in a business office or a fuel-injection system in a combine harvester.) Therefore, when that environment changes, a great deal of work is needed to keep the supporting software functioning properly.

This work is called “maintenance,” and any software engineer or systems analyst will tell you that it takes up the great majority of what programmers are hired to do (more than 75%). Correspondingly, the great majority of programmer-hours (or, if you like, most programmers’ salaries) are spent writing or maintaining internal code that has no commodity value at all—and any reader can verify this at any time simply by checking the programming job listings in the classifieds of any newspaper.

Searching the job ads in your local newspaper is a very enlightening experiment, and I strongly urge you to do it yourself. Look through the job listings under programming, data processing, and software engineering, identify the positions related to software development, and classify them according to whether the software produced is for use or for sale.

It will quickly become clear that, even under the broadest possible definition of “for sale,” at least 19 out of 20 jobs are paid strictly according to use value (that is, the value of intermediate products). That is why we believe only 5% of the software industry is “commodity-value driven.” However, note that the later analysis in this article is not especially sensitive to this number; even if it were 15% or 20%, the economic conclusions would essentially be the same.

(When I speak at technical conferences, I often open with two questions: how many people in the audience work by writing software? How many people’s salaries depend on the commodity value of software? In answer to the first, hands usually shoot up everywhere; for the second, almost nobody raises a hand, and quite a number of listeners are surprised by the proportion.)

Furthermore, if you examine actual customer behavior, the theory that software’s commodity value is closely related to the cost of its development and replacement collapses even more easily. Many goods are partly subject to this theory (before depreciation)—food, automobiles, machine tools. There are even many intangible goods whose commodity value is also closely related to the cost of development and replacement—for example, rights to reproduce music, maps, or databases. The commodity value of these goods can remain unchanged, or even increase, after their original producer exits the market.

By contrast, once the producer of a software product leaves the market (or simply stops producing that product), the price consumers are willing to pay for it quickly drops to almost zero, even if it still theoretically has use value, or if an equivalent product would cost a lot to develop. (To verify this, all you need do is look in the bargain bin of any nearby software store.)

Retailers’ behavior after a producer exits is revealing: it tells us that retailers understand something producers often do not, namely, that the price consumers are willing to pay is effectively capped by the expected future value of vendor service. (Here the word “service” covers a broad range of things including enhancements, upgrades, and follow-on development.)

In other words, the software industry is to a large extent a service industry, except that it operates under a widespread but groundless delusion that it belongs to manufacturing.

It is worth reflecting on why we are usually inclined to believe this delusion. Perhaps it is simply because only that small part of the software industry that produces software for sale advertises its products. And among these, the most common and most heavily advertised products are precisely those short-lived ones that do not require ongoing support, such as games (though of course this is only a special case, not a necessary law).

It is also worth noting that the manufacturing delusion leads to a pathological price structure that does not fall along with actual development costs. If (as we usually believe) more than 75% of the life-cycle cost of a typical software project lies in maintenance, debugging, and extension, then the common strategy of setting a high purchase price but charging almost nothing for support is doomed to leave both buyers and sellers dissatisfied.

Consumers lose, because even though software belongs to the service industry, incentives inherited from the manufacturing model always prevent vendors from providing enough service. If vendors make their money from selling software bits, then money will be invested in creating and shipping software; user support is not a profit center, so it will only get some of the least capable staff, and resources barely enough to avoid alienating a critical number of users.

The other side of the problem is that most vendors using this manufacturing model will also fail in long-term competition. The practice of using fixed sales income to support endlessly ongoing user-support expenses works only so long as the market expands rapidly enough that tomorrow’s income can offset support and overhead costs caused by yesterday’s sales. Once the market matures and sales slow, most vendors have no choice but to drop some products in order to cut support costs.

Whether that cutback is explicit (for example, product discontinuation) or implicit (for example, making it hard for users to obtain service), it has the effect of driving users to competitors (because it destroys the product’s expected future value, which depends on service). In the short term, vendors can escape the trap by releasing bug-fixed versions as new products and setting new prices, but consumers soon get tired of this. Thus the long-term solution is to have no competitors at all—that is, an effective monopoly of the market. In the end, only one vendor remains.

In fact, we have repeatedly seen this failure pattern, caused by lack of support service, squeeze many strong number-two competitors out of the market. (Those who have looked into proprietary PC operating systems, word processors, financial software, or general business software may be especially familiar with this pattern.) The perverse incentives produced by the manufacturing model lead to a “winner takes all” market trend, and in the end even the winning vendor’s customers lose.

If not the manufacturing model, then what? To handle software life-cycle cost structure effectively (both informally and in the professional economic sense), we need a pricing system based on service contracts, subscriptions, and ongoing value exchange between buyer and seller. Therefore, under free-market pursuit of efficiency, we can expect this to be the pricing system that most mature software industries will ultimately adopt.

All of the above gives us insight into why open source software can gradually challenge the existing order not only technically but economically as well. It seems that the result of making software “free” is to force us into a world where “service-support costs” dominate—and to expose how relatively fragile the value structure supporting closed-source software really is.

The word “free” is misleading in another sense too. Lowering costs often leads not to less investment in the supporting infrastructure but more. When the price of cars drops, demand rises—so even in an open source world, the 5% of programmers who live by software’s commodity value are unlikely to be greatly affected. The losers in this transition will not be programmers, but investors who unwisely placed their bets on closed-source development strategies.


4. The myth that "information wants to be free"

There is another myth, completely opposite to the manufacturing delusion but similar in degree, that often confuses people’s view of the economics of open source software. It is the myth that “information wants to be free.” It usually appears in the form of the belief that the zero cost of copying digital information means the price of information should also be zero.

Consider the value of information that gives people a competitive advantage, such as stock charts, Swiss bank account numbers, or keys for obtaining services such as computer account passwords, and the myth collapses in its most general form. Even if such information can be copied at zero cost, the things it authorizes cannot. Therefore, the nonzero minimum value of that thing may be regarded as the value of the information.

I mention this myth here mainly to point out that whether information should be free is irrelevant to the debate over the economic utility of open source; as we shall see later, this irrelevance still holds well even under the assumption that software really does have the value structure of manufactured goods. Therefore we do not need to get entangled in the question of whether software ought to be free.
我完全同意设想建立DOS组织“DOS联盟” ,也就是说和Wengier、以及“起步”站长莫老师等DOS战友一起来建立这个“DOS联盟”,以发展我国自主OS(操作系统)的高度去完成我们共同的愿望。
------党委书记
Floor 6 Posted 2002-12-02 00:00 ·  中国 广东 河源 连平县 电信
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5. The counterexample of the commons

Since we are taking a skeptical view of the currently dominant model, let us see whether we can establish another one—an equally stubborn economic explanation of what makes open source cooperation sustainable.

This is a problem that has to be analyzed on two levels. One is that we need to explain the behavior of the people who contribute to open source projects; the other is that we need to understand the economic forces supporting the cooperation behind open source projects such as Linux and Apache.

First, we still need to overturn a habitual mental pattern that interferes with us. Whenever people try to explain cooperative behavior, Garret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” always seems to loom in the back of their minds.

Hardin’s famous example is to imagine a pasture owned in common by the farmers of an entire village, used to graze their livestock. But grazing degrades the pasture: the grass is eaten away, patches of bare mud gradually appear, and new grass grows only slowly. If there is no generally accepted (and enforced) policy allocating grazing rights to prevent overgrazing, everyone will act in his own interest and drive as many cattle as possible to eat as quickly as possible, trying to gain the greatest benefit before the pasture completely degenerates into a sea of mud.

In most people’s intuition, models of cooperation look something like this. In fact, this does not diagnose the economics of open source very well. What we have here is a “free rider” (undercompensation) problem , not a scramble for a public good (overuse). Yet in most objections I have seen, there is a similar pattern of thinking.

The “tragedy of the commons” has only three possible outcomes: one, the pasture is destroyed and becomes a mudflat; two, some villagers with coercive power forcibly enforce a grazing-allocation policy in the name of the whole village (the communist solution); three, the villagers fence off the parts they are individually able to defend and manage, thereby dividing up the common pasture (the private-property solution).

If this model is reflexively applied to open source cooperation, people reach a result that is unstable and dies halfway. Since there is no way on the Internet to enforce allocation policies on programmers’ working time, the model predicts the direct result that common (software) property will collapse, its different parts will be privatized by different people and turned into closed-source software, and contributions to the public community will rapidly decline.

In fact, our experience clearly shows the actual trend is the opposite: the scope and content of open source development are steadily growing (for example, measured by the daily submission reports to Metalab and the daily announcements on freshmeat.net). Clearly there is some key factor here that the “tragedy of the commons” model cannot explain.

Part of the answer, of course, is that using software does not diminish its value the way grazing damages a pasture. In fact, because users add their own fixes and features (code patches), widespread use of open source software often increases its value; in this counterexample to the commons, grazing makes the grass grow taller.

Another part of the answer is that the recognized market value of small patches to public source code is hard to realize. Suppose I write code to fix an annoying bug, and suppose many people agree that this little piece of code is indeed worth money—how am I supposed to collect that small amount of money from so many people? Though it would often be appropriate for them to pay me such small sums, the overhead of traditional payment methods is too high, making such micro-payments genuinely problematic.

Perhaps it is more accurate to look at it this way: not only is the money hard to collect, in the general case it is even hard to price. As a thought experiment, suppose the Internet had an ideal payment infrastructure—secure, ubiquitous, and with zero overhead. Now suppose you write a little piece of code called “Odds and Ends Patch for the Linux Kernel”—how do you know what price to set for it? And how does a potential buyer know, before seeing the code, how much would be a reasonable amount to pay?

So the problem we face is like a funhouse-mirror version of “F.A. Hayek’s calculation problem” —only a superman could solve it, because to make the transaction happen he would have to be able both to calculate the value of those patch files and to be trusted enough to set the price.

Unfortunately, supermen are in very short supply, so patch author J. Random Hacker is left with only two choices: keep the patch to himself, or give it away for free. The first choice brings no benefit at all; the second may be the same, or it may encourage others to bring out their own patches in similar reciprocity, solving other problems J. Random may run into in the future. On the surface this choice looks altruistic; in fact, from the viewpoint of game theory, it is the smartest kind of selfishness.

When analyzing cooperation of this sort, it is important to note that although a “free rider” problem exists (insufficient funding for work when there is a lack of money or other equivalent reward), it does not grow in direct proportion to the number of end users. The complexity of open source projects and the cost of communication among them are almost entirely a function only of the number of developers involved; a large number of end users who almost never look at the source code create virtually no cost. The probability of naive questions showing up on mailing lists may increase, but this is relatively easy to prevent by maintaining a FAQ list, and then such questioners—who clearly haven’t read the FAQ—can be happily ignored (in fact, both practices are quite typical).

More than anything else, the real “free rider problem” in open source software is the frictional overhead involved in submitting patches. A potential contributor with no status at all in this cultural reputation game (see “Homesteading”) may think, in the absence of financial reward, “Submitting this patch just isn’t worth it, because I’d have to clean it up, write a change memo, and also sign a Free Software Foundation assignment form...” For this reason, the number of contributors to a project (and thus the level of success determined by it) is strongly affected by the burden of rules and procedures imposed on contributors. This resistance can be mechanical and technical, or political. Taken together, these two kinds of resistance may explain why the loose and amorphous Linux culture has attracted cooperative forces an order of magnitude greater than the much more tightly organized and centralized BSD, and also why, compared with the great attention drawn by Linux, the Free Software Foundation has fallen somewhat behind.

So far these explanations are fine, but they are all after-the-fact explanations given after Random Hacker has written the patch and decided to share it freely. The other half we need is an economic explanation of why Random Hacker would think of writing that patch in the first place, instead of writing closed-source software that would bring him commodity-value returns. What business model has created the little climate in which open source development flourishes?


6. Reasons for closed source

Before beginning to classify open source business models, let us first look at the general question of exclusive profit. When we close source, what exactly are we protecting?

Suppose you hire someone to write a special accounting software package for your business. Keeping the source closed rather than open does not make the task any better accomplished; the only rational reason to want it closed is either that you want to sell it to other people, or that you want to prevent competitors from using it.

The surface answer is that you are protecting commodity value, but for the 95% of software written for internal use, this reason does not apply. Then what other benefit is there to closing it?

The second explanation (preserving competitive advantage) is also worth examining. Suppose you open the source of that accounting software, it comes into wide use and benefits from improvements by its user base. Now your competitors start using it too. They get the benefit without paying development costs and cut into your business—is this argument against open source valid?

Maybe yes, maybe no. The real question is whether the benefit you gain from spreading the development burden exceeds the loss caused by increased free-rider competition. Many people often fail to make the proper tradeoff because they (a) ignore the functional benefits of recruiting more help in development, and (b) fail to see how dramatically development costs can decrease. By hypothesis, you are going to bear development costs anyway (either as closed development costs or as competitive losses), so it is wrong to count them as costs of open source (if you insist on seeing them that way).

There are other reasons for closed source that are also completely irrational. For example, you may have the illusion that closed source makes your business system more secure and better able to prevent vandals and intruders. If so, I suggest you consult a cryptography expert immediately. Real professional paranoiacs understand much better that the security of closed-source programs cannot be trusted, because they have learned that lesson from bitter experience. Security is one aspect of reliability; only algorithms and implementations that have gone through thorough peer review can be trusted as secure.


7. The use-value investment model

One key fact we can notice from the distinction between use value and commodity value is this: only commodity value is threatened by the transition from closed source to open source; use value is not.

If use value, rather than commodity value, is really the main motive force behind software development, and if (as “Cathedral” claimed) open source development really is more effective and more efficient than the closed way, then we should expect to find environments where anticipated use value alone has sustainably funded open source development.

In fact it is not difficult to identify at least two important models in which the salaries of full-time open source project developers are paid strictly by use value.

7.1 The Apache case: cost sharing

Suppose the company you work for needs a high-capacity, high-reliability WWW server for mission-critical business, perhaps for electronic commerce, perhaps because you are a mass-media outlet selling ad space, perhaps because you are a portal site, and you need 24-hour uptime, speed, and customizability.

How can you get these? There are three basic strategies:

Buy a proprietary server software package. By doing this, you are betting that the software vendor can deliver on time and has enough technical competence to implement it correctly. Even if both conditions are met, its product may initially have poor customization features; you may be able to modify it only through hooks the vendor chooses to provide. This proprietary-server route is not very common.

Develop one yourself. This choice cannot be ruled out immediately: WWW servers are not very complex, certainly much simpler than browsers, and a specialized one can be made very compact and flexible. If you go this way, you can get the functionality and customizability you want, though you will pay in development time, and when you retire or leave, your company may find maintaining it becomes a problem.

Join the Apache group. The Apache server was developed by website administrators on the Internet who realized that instead of many people developing it independently, it was smarter to concentrate their efforts on improving the same base code. By doing this, they could obtain the advantages of self-development together with the powerful debugging effect of massive parallel peer review.

The advantages of choosing Apache are very obvious. Netcraft’s monthly survey tells us just how obvious. It shows that since the beginning of the survey, Apache’s market share has steadily expanded relative to other proprietary server software, and as of June 1999, Apache and its derivatives held 61% of the market (see http://www.netcraft.com/survey/ ; the latest result on December 2 is 54.81%)—it has no legal owner, no advertising campaign, and absolutely no contracted service organization behind it.

The Apache story can be summarized as this model: software users discover that funding open source development is beneficial, because in this way they get a much better product at a much lower price than by other means.

7.2 The Cisco case: risk spreading

A few years ago at Cisco, two programmers were assigned to write a distributed network print-spooling system for the company’s internal network. This was no small challenge. Besides allowing any user A to print on any printer B (perhaps next door or a thousand miles away), the system also had to guarantee that when paper ran out or toner ran low, print jobs would automatically switch to another nearby printer, while the system also had to report such problems to the printer administrator.

This pair cleverly completed the task by making a series of modifications to standard Unix print-spooling software and adding some peripheral command files. Then they realized that both they and Cisco had a problem.

The problem was that neither of them was likely to stay at Cisco forever. In the end, both of them would leave, and the software would have nobody to maintain it, and it would slowly rot (that is, gradually cease to fit the actual working environment). Nobody likes to see his own work end that way, and the two brave partners felt Cisco was buying another solution and reasonably expected it to last longer than their own program.

So they went to their manager and strongly urged him to release this print-spooling software as open source. Their argument was that Cisco would lose no commodity value, but gain a great deal. By encouraging a distributed user base and a growing cooperative developer community across many companies, Cisco could effectively solve the problem of the original developers of the software leaving.

The Cisco story can be summarized as another model, in which the cost-reducing effect of open source is less important than its role in spreading risk. All parties discover that open source, and the existence of a cooperative community with multiple independent sources of income, provide a form of insurance that is itself economically very valuable—valuable enough to justify investment in it.


8. Why the commodity-value view is problematic

Open source makes it rather difficult to obtain commodity value directly from software sales, but the difficulty is not technical: source code is no easier to copy than executable code, and copyright law, if enforced so as to allow the capture of commodity value, need not be any harder to apply to open source products than to closed-source ones.

The difficulty lies in the nature of the social contract that supports open source development. For three mutually reinforcing reasons, the major open source copyright licenses do not allow most of the restrictions on use, redistribution, and modification that would be attached in order to facilitate the direct capture of commodity value. To understand these reasons, we must examine the social environment in which these forms of copyright exist: the Internet hacker culture.

Although (even in 1999) all kinds of myths about hacker culture still exist outside hacker circles, these reasons have nothing to do with hostility toward the market economy. Although a small minority are indeed somewhat hostile to the profit motive, the community as a whole is quite willing to cooperate with profit-seeking Linux distributors such as Red Hat, SUSE, and Caldera, and most hackers are very willing to cooperate with society at large so long as their original intentions are not betrayed. The reasons hackers oppose licensing aimed at direct profit are much subtler and more interesting.

One reason has to do with symmetry. Although most open source developers are not themselves opposed to others profiting from their gifts, most insist that no party (except perhaps the original author of the code) should occupy a privileged position for profit. Mr. Random Hacker is willing to let, say, some Fubarco company sell his software or patch for profit, but only on the condition that he himself will still have the possibility of profiting from it later.

Another reason has to do with consequences they do not wish to see. Hackers have noticed that copyrights containing restrictions or fees for “commercial” use and sale (the most common and least embarrassing way to seek direct commodity value) have severe chilling effects. A special case is the legal restrictions imposed on redistributing cheap CD-ROM collections, something that ideally ought to be encouraged. More generally, restrictions on use/sale/modification/distribution (and other complexities in licenses) generate overhead for tracking compliance, and (as the number of software packages that must be handled increases) generate a noticeable combination of uncertainty, potential legal risk, and explosive growth in all the ways these can combine. This result is considered harmful, and therefore strong social pressure keeps licenses simple and free of restrictions.

The last and most crucial reason has to do with preserving the peer review and gift-culture dynamics described in “Homesteading.” License restrictions designed to protect intellectual property and obtain direct commodity value often make it impossible to legally fork a new project (for example, Sun’s so-called “community source” licenses for Jini and Java are cases of this). Although (for reasons explained in detail in “Homesteading”) forking is frowned upon and only a last resort forced by necessity, it is still considered extremely important, in case the original maintainers become incompetent or betray their path (for example by moving to a more closed license).

The hacker community has some room for compromise on symmetry; therefore it tolerates licenses such as Netscape’s NPL, which give the original author of the code certain profit privileges (in the case of NPL, specifically the exclusive privilege of using open-source Mozilla code in derivative and closed-source products). It has much less room for compromise on unpredictability, and absolutely no room at all on preserving the right to fork. (This is also why Sun’s “community license” schemes for Java and Jini are despised by the hacker community.)

These reasons also explain the clauses of the “Open Source Definition,” which aims to articulate the key characteristics of the hacker community’s standard open source licenses (fully permissive licenses, GPL, BSD license, MIT license, Artistic license, and so on). These clauses have the practical effect—though not intentionally—of making the direct capture of commodity value very difficult.


9. Indirect commodity-value models

Nevertheless, it is still possible to obtain what might be called indirect commodity value by creating markets for software and related services. There are five known and two speculative such models (and possibly more will appear in the future).

9.1 Loss leader / market position

In this model, you use open source software to create or maintain market position for proprietary software services that generate direct revenue streams. In the most common version of this, open source client software drives sales of server software, or subscription/ad revenue for portal sites.

This was the strategy Netscape used when it opened the source code of the Mozilla browser in early 1998. The browser part of its business made up about 13%, and that share was declining after Microsoft released IE. IE’s powerful market offensive (and later the not-so-upright bundling practices that became the focus of the antitrust case) rapidly invaded Netscape’s browser market, giving rise to fears that Microsoft might intentionally monopolize the browser market and then use de facto control over HTML standards to drive Netscape out of the server market.

By opening the source of the still widely popular Netscape browser, Netscape effectively blocked the possibility of Microsoft achieving total browser monopoly. They hoped open source cooperation would speed browser development and testing, and hoped Microsoft’s IE would be held to no more than a position of barely catching up, while also preventing proprietary modification of HTML.

This strategy succeeded. By November 1998, Netscape had actually begun to recover some commercial market share taken by IE. By the time Netscape was acquired by AOL in early 1999, the competitive advantage of keeping Mozilla development alive was so obvious that one of AOL’s first public commitments was to continue supporting the Mozilla project, even though it was still only in the early alpha stage.

9.2 Widget frosting

This model suits hardware manufacturers (in this context, “hardware” includes anything from Ethernet cards or other peripheral boards all the way up to complete computer systems). Market pressure has already forced hardware companies to write and maintain software (ranging from device drivers and configuration tools all the way to complete operating systems), but the software itself is not a profit center; it is overhead—and often a substantial one.

In this situation, opening the source is almost a no-brainer. No revenue stream is lost, so there is hardly any downside. What the vendor gains is a dramatically expanded development community, faster and more flexible response to user needs, and better reliability through peer review. It can be ported freely to other environments, and it is very likely also to increase user loyalty, because technical people among the users invest more programming time customizing it to suit their needs.




—Excerpted from: CN Linux NET
我完全同意设想建立DOS组织“DOS联盟” ,也就是说和Wengier、以及“起步”站长莫老师等DOS战友一起来建立这个“DOS联盟”,以发展我国自主OS(操作系统)的高度去完成我们共同的愿望。
------党委书记
Floor 7 Posted 2009-04-26 11:30 ·  中国 辽宁 锦州 联通
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Thanks to the Party Secretary's good article. I also want to switch to LINUX, but I can't afford the energy. There are many things to do.
Floor 8 Posted 2009-05-05 13:34 ·  中国 江苏 南京 电信
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Capitalism's Windows is too deeply ingrained
Communism's Linux still needs time
Floor 9 Posted 2009-11-19 18:28 ·  中国 四川 成都 电信
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Are there many people who are working?
Floor 10 Posted 2016-05-17 21:32 ·  中国 广东 云浮 电信
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Communism is a broad concept, and this belief stems from the pursuit of freedom and equality. Historian Wells regarded the ideas advocated by Jesus as communism - the kingdom of heaven. Jesus often urged people: Please believe in me, the kingdom of heaven is coming soon. And people may be so accustomed to the phrase "all are equal before God" that they lose the sense. In fact, it is the most basic equality - equality of human rights - to oppose oppression and exploitation. And Buddha promotes "equality of all beings" more. So Buddhists cannot kill living beings because in Buddhist beliefs, humans and animals are equal. When...
鱼沫相濡,不如相忘江湖。
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