China DOS Union

Reflections on Cisco's threat to national security and illegal operations in the Chinese market (repost)


First of all, let me state that I previously worked in R&D at Cisco China. During the staff cuts in 2001,
I voluntarily asked to be transferred to China to do technical support,
and later moved into sales-related work. As a Chinese person with a conscience, I guarantee that the facts stated are completely true,
and I am willing, at an appropriate time, to come forward and testify about Cisco and its illegal acts in China and the harm it has caused to national security.
Because I have long
been involved in Cisco-related work, I have in my hands a large amount of evidence of Cisco obtaining the market through illegal means, and also part of a customer list
of customers whose projects were illegally interfered with in their normal
operation (using illegal means to force customers to give projects to Cisco).


Secondly, let me state that Du Jiabin is the grandnephew of Shanghai gangster tycoon Du Yuesheng, and he is very well connected in both the underworld and the establishment.
The so-called strong ability to work on the government
is nothing more than Du Yuesheng's kind of methods: using benefits to lure people and using different means to coerce users, such as using certain senior officials and
their spokesmen to coerce subordinate departments with administrative ties, or using judicial jurisdiction relationships to coerce other depart
ments that have no business relationship. This
is exactly the superb method our management often prides itself on, and they often boast that "Cisco understands national conditions best."
This is also the essence and key of Cisco's
marketing methods on the mainland. Several of our vice presidents in the China region are all "10-dan" masters in this area. Before joining Cisco
they were already highly accomplished in
this field, and after joining Cisco China they became even more like fish in water. The key role actually played by Cisco's agents
is to launder money,
and Cisco can also place itself in a "clean" position, which is where the cleverness lies.


Because of my special position at Cisco (China), I have been able to come into contact with and participate in some of the dirty-money bribery processes,
so I know these illegal operations fairly well. I wrote this letter at great personal risk to my safety, entirely out of consideration for the national interest, and not because
I received unfair treatment at Cis
co (China). If anything happens to me, I have already entrusted another mainland colleague of mine with a conscience to make public
my personal
details and the facts I possess about Cisco's illegal market operations.


A special statement: this letter only ******** people's actions,
and does not ******** Cisco (China)'s view of the matter, although the great majority of Cisco Chi
na employees do have a conscience. In addition,
there is another phenomenon I want to report: because the main management of Cisco (China) all come
from Taiwan, in their daily work they are very exclusionary toward mainland employees (a large number of excellent mainland employees face unequal opportunities),
and some im
portant meetings are attended only by them. Personally, I believe this is not entirely due to the commercial needs of market sales,
and other reasons cannot be ruled out either.
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out whether they also carry a "special mission." I suggest that, on the one hand, Cisco (China) be forced
to maintain a certain proportion
of mainland managers; on the other hand, a special investigation should be carried out into their conduct.
If there is no "special mission," then that would also return them their "inno
cence."


1. Cisco's illegal market operation methods


In 1994, Cisco entered China. Over these years, how much tax has it paid for the country? Taking Cisco's 2001 and 2002 figures as examples,
Cisco sold 1 billion US dollars in China each year. Value-added tax was 17%, customs tariff in 2001 was 3%, and in 2002 customs tariff was 3.8%.
According to the country's
tariff policy, projects for national technological transformation can have customs duties partially exempted,
but value-added tax absolutely cannot be exempted. In this
way, the various taxes Cisco should have paid in 2001 were between 1.7 and 3 billion RMB; taking the middle value, about 2.5 billion RMB.
In 2002 the various taxes it should have paid
were between 1.7 and 2.1 billion; taking the middle value, about 1.8 billion,
but in reality the various taxes Cisco paid each year were less than 100 million RM
B.


Cisco's four specialized import-export company agents
use places like Tianjin and Shanghai bonded zones for smuggling,
so the actual customs declarations and taxes paid are very low,
vastly different from what should have been paid. These four import-export companies (all with very powerful backgrounds,
relevant departments ought to investigate them) are Cisco's money-laundering tools for entering the Chinese market,
using state tax revenue to buy off certain powerful people.
These people use their positions to directly make calls on some procurement projects and directly decide procurement for projects. Through a single Cisco sale, they all
can get large commission returns (the tax revenue the state should have received and the agent commissions).
If these illegal gains came from profits given up by Cisco, that would still
be one thing, but they mainly come from the loss of state tax revenue.
The tax revenue the state should have gotten thus turns into dirty money for Cisco to buy off some people.


Now Cisco has manufacturing partners such as Foxconn in the mainland, and some products are produced in these factories.
Cisco uses methods such as purchasing components at high prices from the US and other places, or inflating the nominal import prices of the import-export companies, to complete the transfer of dirty money
abroad into the ac
counts of these bought-off personnel.


It is exactly the existence of this kind of illegal behavior
that has seriously damaged our motherland's international image. When I was in the US, I was often confronted by questions and
cross-examinations from American colleagues, and I felt deeply ashamed. A portion of the nation's scum, for private gain, do not hesitate to sacrifice national interests.
I suggest that the relevant state departments carry
out a special investigation into Cisco's tax payments and illegal acts, and bring the related lawbreakers to justice.


2. Cisco products threaten national security, and the degree of harm is far greater than Microsoft's


I previously did R&D at Cisco headquarters. Cisco headquarters has an unwritten rule
that ethnic Chinese cannot participate in the core software devel
opment of routing products (nominally out of concern that core technology might be transferred, but in reality to prevent leaks of related secret operations),
and can only participate in the development of non-core businesses such as VoIP.
But intelligence departments taking part in setting backdoors in core products is an open secret inside Cisco.



There is a strange phenomenon. Anyone doing R&D knows that under pressure from US intelligence departments, for Cisco to tamper with its products
is extre
mely easy. The threat Cisco products pose to national security is far greater than Microsoft's products. It is very easy to find reports that Microsoft prod
ucts are insecure, but it is rare to find reports that Cisco products are insecure. Why is that? First,
Microsoft's threat to information security is
not the final stage; Cisco's network products are the final stage. For networks not built on Cisco product architecture,
improper behavior by Microsoft can be analyzed out through packet analysis,
while Cisco products are the last checkpoint,
so any tampering they do is very hard to discover. Second,
Cisco's ability to work on people is much higher
than Microsoft's. Cisco often gets things done through improper methods. Because it is experienced in such operations, it rarely slips up.
This is also an important reason for Cisco's success.
For the sake of success, it will spare no means,
using the pretext of inviting some people to the US or Australia for "inspection tours" to smooth over many things. From a business point of
view, after several years of development, mainland China
is no longer behind in the use of information technology. The US and Australia long ago lost
any meaning as places for "inspection." Such inspections are often just the process of bribery negotiations and opening personal dirty-money accounts abroad.



If other countries have even a little doubt about the security of Cisco products, that instead shows Cisco's security can to a certain extent
be guar
anteed. Having not a single voice of doubt is very abnormal. If after a few days this article can no longer be found online, that will fur
ther prove Cisco's "crisis public-relations" ability, and give even more reason to doubt the security of its products.


The main sources of intelligence collection by US intelligence agencies:


First, the Internet: specialized analysis of sensitive Internet information and information from sensitive departments.
Because Cisco carries the networks of the government, ****, customs,
operating networks, and other sensitive departments, and knows the network topology very clearly, it can carry out targeted transfer and analysis of related information. The US intelli
gence de
partments completely grasp the Internet topology map of the whole world, and any information collection is under their control;
Second, satellites: collection and monitoring through spy satellites. They can monitor ground conditions and listen in on mobile phone calls.
This has already been very clearly demonstrated in the recent US-Iraq war;
Third, global ground monitoring stations (set up in Taiwan, the UK, Japan, and elsewhere), serving as a supplementary role for information interception.



As the number-one channel by which US intelligence departments (Taiwanese intelligence departments cannot be ruled out) collect information, the Internet in fact means Cisco products
pose a far greater security threat to our country than Microsoft does. It is only that Cisco's ability to work on people is far greater than Microsoft's,
and its methods of obtaining information are even more concealed (it can be done simply by automatically making hidden settings on routers, and customers cannot discover it at all),
so it has not yet been noticed by the world.


Generally speaking,
the threat posed by Microsoft's products to national security and information security has won broad consensus in countries such as Japan and the EU. Relatively speaking,
the threat posed by Cisco products to national security is far greater than that of Microsoft's products. For example, when installing Microsoft's products, one must submit
serial
numbers, personal names, email addresses, company names, and other information.
What is that for? In fact, this data is sent through Microsoft's
"backdoor" programs to Microsoft's user information database in the US. If the information filled in during installation is real, Microsoft has a
very clear picture of piracy by Chinese individuals and enterprises. Microsoft's operations can still be analyzed out during the network transmission process.
From this point of view, Cisco
routers, as the final checkpoint for Internet information transmission, if they are tampered with, it cannot be detected.
Therefore, the threat Cisco products pose to national security is even more concealed, and the harm is much greater.


In fact, Cisco products are a major source of information for US intelligence.
Cisco products themselves have "backdoors" set up for intelligence purposes.
When problems arise at Cisco, they often use super passwords to modify configurations or delete unfavorable log information. Cisco can target rel
evant networks and
add some "extra" chips or enhanced chips into the products. Even on networks that are completely physically isolated, it can still obtain
sensitive information through wireless means
without anyone noticing. Especially for some Cisco supply projects whose delivery times become inexplicably long,
perhaps Cisco is setting more traps in the products, first needing to do some kind of verification and the like.


If Cisco cooperates with Microsoft, then it becomes seamless. They can steal any information without anyone knowing.
Through Microsoft's software, the MAC addresses of relevant sensitive information can be located, and Cisco can trigger certain illegal operations through its own backdoors. Of course,
Microsoft can also automatically search sensi
tive information on servers or PCs and, under appropriate conditions, through backdoor programs, send all or part of the related information away.


Suggestions:


1. When installing Microsoft's Windows, Office, database, and other software, whether genuine or pirated, do not use real
personal names
or organization names, especially on devices holding sensitive information.
2. Carry out a special investigation and real-time inspection of Cisco's source code, and determine whether some backdoor information points to the US CIA or to Taiwan's
intelligence departments
(Taiwan has intelligence departments set up in the US, specifically targeting the mainland).
3. Never use Cisco equipment for firewalls. Once Cisco products are used for security products,
Cisco's entry into any network becomes even more unobstructed, and it will not leave any trace at all.
4. The designed topologies and IP address allo
cation details of some key networks should all be state secrets.
Cisco must not obtain this infor
mation, otherwise Cisco can feed this information back to US intelligence departments and obtain information by "fixed-point
" means whenever needed.
For networks built by Cisco, it knows the network topology and IP address information like the back of its hand; all these are time bombs.
5. All Cisco equipment should undergo comprehensive electromagnetic inspection.
Network products already in use should undergo regular electromagnetic testing,
to prevent illegally configured electromagnetic leakage in the products from being activated when needed and used for intelligence gathering without being discovered.
6. Require Cisco to open its source code, and compilation must be done only within China
under the monitoring of relevant state departments,
so as to avoid the source code compiled by Cisco differing from the source code submitted for examination, with the actual products still containing traps.


Please spread this widely.
Remember this, remember this!

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