Microsoft Confidential
Have you ever wondered?
In the 21st century, the technology era dominated by computers,
Why did one computer high-tech company after another fall from grace and suffer heavy losses?
Is it really due to poor management, improper administration, or lack of talent?
But why? He -
Microsoft Corporation,
stands out uniquely and dominates the computer kingdom?
Is it only it that can really preserve its strength and continuously innovate?
Is it only it that is well-managed and has a wealth of talent?
Or is there indeed a hand behind its success, manipulating the market, manipulating the world, and manipulating all behind-the-scenes transactions?
Have you noticed that behind the colorful halo of Microsoft,
That little-known - confidential document!
Washington was in front of a large pile of documents on his desk, confused.
"How is this possible? This is so astonishing!" he said to his colleagues. His colleagues, like him, were currently mired in a large pile of documents about Microsoft, and these documents made them feel, besides surprise, a bit incredible.
At the end of 1992, Microsoft's development showed a leapfrog speed, and sales soared like a helicopter. So far, it seems that Gates' goal has been achieved. In the operating system market, only Microsoft's software is left. Gates has successfully eliminated all his competitors and monopolized the entire computer software market. The market seems like a chess piece in Bill Gates' hand, for him to manipulate.
Washington and Sicoret were at this time studying the secret memos between Microsoft's business department and computer OEM manufacturers.
They discovered that in the fall of 1990, in the emails and documents exchanged between Bill Gates, Steve Ballmer, and other people and Microsoft's negotiation expert Joe Cheng Kempin, they talked about that "per processor" contract that many people mentioned. The strange thing was that at that time, Microsoft had not yet developed the MS-DOS 5.0 version, but in their confidential document, it showed that they had used this product to tempt computer manufacturers around the world to sign contracts with Microsoft in order to block the market in advance.
A Microsoft secret memo pointed out that the company was the leading one in the industry and that the future must be bright. This memo written in October 1990 clearly instructed his managers on how to create this bright future.
"The Microsoft Confidential Document" shows that Jeff Lan, the European director of Microsoft, under the guidance of Ballmer and Kempin, carefully analyzed the performance of the European market of Microsoft in the first quarter of the fiscal year 1991 and wrote down the goals for the second quarter. At that time, Lan had just been promoted from the position of regional group manager in the United States to the business director in charge of Microsoft's computer OEM manufacturers in Europe.
Just the performance under Lan's hands, this quarter had already exceeded the budget by 120%, and sales reached nearly ten million US dollars.
"DOS, just this product that will always monopolize the market, has already accounted for 66% to 70% of Lan's total income."
It seemed that there were no other software in Europe, and it seemed that every computer in Europe had sucked Microsoft's "cocaine" and only adored Microsoft's DOS.
The sales of Windows in Europe were also very strong, accounting for 8% of the total income. By 1992, Windows had become as popular as DOS, with monthly sales as high as 1 million copies. This was mainly because Microsoft used methods of giving for free and cutting prices to distribute, threatening computer manufacturers to make them sign a large number of Windows contracts, just as they had to sign Microsoft's DOS under the drive of interests back then.
In Jeff Lan's correspondence, it also recorded the "major negotiation" between Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard. In this negotiation, Microsoft obviously attempted to "substantially increase Hewlett-Packard's DOS royalty".
The lawyers of the Federal Trade Commission flipped through these thrilling confidential documents and kept opening their mouths in surprise, as if the things in front of them were some tales from a thousand and one nights. They noticed that in a Microsoft internal secret communication, Microsoft openly told those computer manufacturers: Unless they sign a DOS contract with Microsoft, they cannot purchase Windows software. Although this forced pre-installation practice was an obvious transaction violating fair competition laws, Microsoft repeatedly mentioned it in the confidential documents.
The person in charge of the Far East Diamond Trading Company, Mike, had received such a letter:
Dear Mike:
I am writing this letter in response to our discussion yesterday. I must further confirm with you that Microsoft cannot sell Windows software alone.
Microsoft can only sell you the combination of Windows and DOS 5.0.
Sincerely
Business Department of Computer OEM Manufacturers
Microsoft Corporation
Everyone in Microsoft knew that their boss Bill Gates hated DR-DOS extremely. He once said that he never wanted to see any manufacturer, especially those in the Far East, using DR-DOS to equip their computers. He repeatedly reduced the price of Microsoft's MS-DOS, willing to risk not making a profit to knock the opponent down. Driven by Gates' strategy, almost all large and small manufacturers in the Far East were fond of Microsoft's DOS products that were almost below cost price.
The sky was gradually darkening, and the gray weather cast a heavy shadow in Washington's heart. Washington stood up, and he seemed to have seen Bill Gates' intention through these messy exchanges of documents marked "Microsoft Confidential". It seemed that Microsoft had been heading towards the path of a monopolist: increasing market share, secretly undermining the rival's sphere of influence, monopolizing the entire market, and then driving up prices. At this time, they could plunder back the money they lost in the price war a thousandfold and a hundredfold.
Although Microsoft repeatedly claimed that they had never done anything against the market because the price of the products sold to consumers by Microsoft had been decreasing. But Washington and his colleagues had already felt that the current price consumers got was not the only standard to measure plunder. Maybe, after Microsoft successfully suppressed the opponent, the price supplied to computer manufacturers would start to increase.
In April 1990, DR-DOS 5.0 was launched, and Gates' all anger was vented. In a few months, all of Microsoft's business teams went out to fight, and almost signed contracts with all computer manufacturers for Microsoft's MS-DOS 5.0, making these manufacturers have no choice but to use DR-DOS 5.0. Gates repeatedly claimed that his product (DOS 5.0) would also be launched in the market in 1990, but in fact, it was not until June 1991 that Microsoft's DOS 5.0 was truly launched.
Washington and his colleagues noticed that since Novell acquired Digital Equipment Corporation a few months ago, Gates' anger burned in every letter sent from his computer. During this period, Novell tried hard to try to get computer manufacturers such as Compaq and IBM to use DR-DOS, but no matter what price it used, it had no chance to get any business because Microsoft's price was always lower than theirs. At the same time, Gates kept complaining to his friend and deputy Ballmer through one email after another that it was because of this hateful DR-DOS that he could not increase the price of Microsoft's software.
"How can we make a profit with DR-DOS?" Gates roared.
Novell's lawyer Bradford and his partners successively handed over many materials to the Federal Trade Commission. In the hallway of the competition bureau office where Washington was located, the evidence materials had piled up higher than his knees. All the materials showed that Microsoft continuously lowered prices to tempt computer manufacturers, and at the same time, Microsoft sold DOS and Windows together and promised to provide the upcoming Workgroup Windows version for free.
There were so many materials from all sides that Washington and his colleagues felt out of breath. "Gates is really an energetic person", he sighed, "He is not only a genius in computer software, but also has the talent to strangle his rivals."
At this time, Lotus' lawyer Berg wrote a letter to the investigator of the Federal Trade Commission, pleading with the Federal Trade Commission to take action against Microsoft's unfair competition practices. He said: "Lotus will fully cooperate with your actions. We will expose how Microsoft violated the US antitrust laws, especially the second part of the Sherman Act."
Berg was most worried that the Federal Trade Commission would ignore Microsoft's current crazy plundering behavior in the application software market. Gates used his power to rapidly take over the market share of each of his rival's best-selling products in the application software market. And when the Federal Trade Commission's long-term investigation was over, there might be no products other than Microsoft in the market.
Berg wrote in the letter: "We believe that any forced action... should be greatly focused on Microsoft's unfair competition practices in the application software and other related product markets (such as spreadsheets, word processing, email, etc.), not only limited to the operating system market (such as DOS)... Those unfair competition practices have not only spread greatly but also strongly harmed the competition and rivals in the related markets. We believe that in the application software market and related software markets, the harm that such unfair competition practices may bring to consumers will be far greater than that in the operating system market."
Every day, the huge "Microsoft Confidential Document" database brings many shocks to Washington and Sicoret. Washington simply didn't know if his mouth that kept involuntarily opening wide could still close when he kept reading like this. As he read, he thought that it seemed that Bill Gates, like every senior programmer of Microsoft, might have some "quite wild" ideas after a few cans of beer. Of course, Gates and ordinary designers thought differently at present. Designers thought about how to design their software, while Bill Gates thought about how to set a trap for his rivals.
It was really a miracle that the lawyers of the Federal Trade Commission had this opportunity to peek into the true face of the world's most profitable enterprise. He found that all the meetings and conversations within Microsoft, including their emails and memos, were quite unrestrained. Sometimes, the lawyers couldn't believe why they could express their will so bluntly, and this will was obviously wrong.
As early as the beginning of this century, Senator Sherman, the founder of the Sherman Act, had distinguished between "attempted monopoly" and "maintaining monopoly status with superior technology". But the lawyers of the Federal Trade Commission found that in Microsoft's confidential documents, there was no place showing that Microsoft was trying to win through "superior technology". On the contrary, their monopoly intention was gradually permeating.
In an email from Jim, the senior vice president of Microsoft, to Gates, discussing the importance of making Novell unable to gain a foothold in the operating system market, the letter directly wrote: "As long as one mistake is made, we will be frustrated in many aspects. This is not as difficult as imagined. If you want to kill someone, you don't need to waste too much effort, and you don't need to get angry. You just need to pull the trigger. No matter how red-faced the discussion was before, it's just a waste of time. We just need to smile and then gently pull the trigger at Novell."
Washington's jaw started to come unhinged again, and he felt that this tone was so much like someone, like who? Was it that German named Hitler?
The pile of documents in front of Washington and his colleagues, and the documents piling up higher and higher in the hallway, were all revealing the wanton illegal acts of a famous big company to these lawyers with rich professional knowledge. And here, they also discovered many strange things that they had not noticed before. These situations were not only shocking but also intolerable.
- Before May 1991, the federal government's antitrust investigation of Microsoft was not made public, but a senior executive of Wenquan Software Company leaked this secret to an analyst on Wall Street. He said that the ins and outs of this matter were heard from Microsoft.
- A colleague of the Federal Trade Commission mentioned an investment report during a meeting with Microsoft's chief lawyer Newcomb. That was all professional secrets. But after a few days, the content discussed that day appeared in newspapers all over the country.
- A reporter called Sicoret and asked him if he was going to expand the scope of the investigation of Microsoft to the entire business methods of Microsoft. Sicoret said that he couldn't disclose the Federal Trade Commission's investigation, which was a well-known discipline. But this reporter told Sicoret that Microsoft had faxed the letters from the Federal Trade Commission to Microsoft to major media.
Washington and Sicoret were very dissatisfied with Microsoft's irresponsible behavior. They found Newcomb and asked him why he leaked the news. All along, the unpublicized investigation would not have a decision until the entire investigation was completed. During this period, it should not be publicized to the media or the outside world. But Newcomb didn't take their questions seriously at all. "It's none of your business." he answered arrogantly.
Now, Washington and Sicoret were reading the emails exchanged between Microsoft's senior executives in September 1991. At this time, it was just before Microsoft released the "Christmas test version" of the primary version of Windows 3.1. According to the letters, Microsoft's senior executives were intensively discussing how to promote this product incompatible with competitors' operating systems.
This was a memo from David Cole, the vice president of Microsoft. This memo was also sent to Jim Silverberg, the senior vice president of Microsoft, and another engineer.
The email read: "We must clearly ensure that Windows 3.1 can only run on MS-DOS or the MS-DOS computer OEM manufacturer version. I have discussed with our legal department. The legal department is drafting a warning text. If someone tries to run Windows on an 'incompatible' operating system, this text will immediately appear on the computer screen. We will let the user still have the option to continue working after the warning text appears. But after a while, we can definitely mess up that computer's system, and all users will find that they must use our operating system, and they have no choice."
Then Cole asked how Microsoft would start to "ensure that Windows is only compatible with MS-DOS".
Silverberg replied: "The guy who sees this warning text may first be very unhappy, and then when he finds a bug, he will be more suspicious that there is a problem with DR-DOS. Then he may go out to buy a copy of MS-DOS, or simply decide not to use the computer anymore."
Next, in the email that Silverberg wrote to Steve Ballmer, he suggested that when Microsoft received a customer's call asking what to do about the error warning message appearing on the computer, Microsoft's employees should tell those customers using DR-DOS: "We only support customers using MS-DOS." Of course, they might also call the manufacturer producing DR-DOS, or we could "add a mild statement during installation... but it doesn't need to appear every time the user starts Windows."
He explained that this "kind" statement should not anger anyone or alarm the media. To deal with the calls from DR-DOS users, it was only necessary to record a paragraph in Microsoft's telephone voice system, such as: If you are not a customer using MS-DOS, press " #" twice. Then, he pointed out that the person who pressed " #" twice could hear a pre-recorded message.
Next, Silverberg and Ballmer discussed the decisive key of the matter, that is, how to lock the customers so that they always only use Microsoft's MS-DOS. He wrote: "Judging from the development of the situation, the wisest choice is to continue to establish the dependence of Windows on MS-DOS."
This last sentence was exactly the core of the whole incident. "Continuing to establish the dependence of Windows on MS-DOS" itself was monopoly.
Have you ever wondered?
In the 21st century, the technology era dominated by computers,
Why did one computer high-tech company after another fall from grace and suffer heavy losses?
Is it really due to poor management, improper administration, or lack of talent?
But why? He -
Microsoft Corporation,
stands out uniquely and dominates the computer kingdom?
Is it only it that can really preserve its strength and continuously innovate?
Is it only it that is well-managed and has a wealth of talent?
Or is there indeed a hand behind its success, manipulating the market, manipulating the world, and manipulating all behind-the-scenes transactions?
Have you noticed that behind the colorful halo of Microsoft,
That little-known - confidential document!
Washington was in front of a large pile of documents on his desk, confused.
"How is this possible? This is so astonishing!" he said to his colleagues. His colleagues, like him, were currently mired in a large pile of documents about Microsoft, and these documents made them feel, besides surprise, a bit incredible.
At the end of 1992, Microsoft's development showed a leapfrog speed, and sales soared like a helicopter. So far, it seems that Gates' goal has been achieved. In the operating system market, only Microsoft's software is left. Gates has successfully eliminated all his competitors and monopolized the entire computer software market. The market seems like a chess piece in Bill Gates' hand, for him to manipulate.
Washington and Sicoret were at this time studying the secret memos between Microsoft's business department and computer OEM manufacturers.
They discovered that in the fall of 1990, in the emails and documents exchanged between Bill Gates, Steve Ballmer, and other people and Microsoft's negotiation expert Joe Cheng Kempin, they talked about that "per processor" contract that many people mentioned. The strange thing was that at that time, Microsoft had not yet developed the MS-DOS 5.0 version, but in their confidential document, it showed that they had used this product to tempt computer manufacturers around the world to sign contracts with Microsoft in order to block the market in advance.
A Microsoft secret memo pointed out that the company was the leading one in the industry and that the future must be bright. This memo written in October 1990 clearly instructed his managers on how to create this bright future.
"The Microsoft Confidential Document" shows that Jeff Lan, the European director of Microsoft, under the guidance of Ballmer and Kempin, carefully analyzed the performance of the European market of Microsoft in the first quarter of the fiscal year 1991 and wrote down the goals for the second quarter. At that time, Lan had just been promoted from the position of regional group manager in the United States to the business director in charge of Microsoft's computer OEM manufacturers in Europe.
Just the performance under Lan's hands, this quarter had already exceeded the budget by 120%, and sales reached nearly ten million US dollars.
"DOS, just this product that will always monopolize the market, has already accounted for 66% to 70% of Lan's total income."
It seemed that there were no other software in Europe, and it seemed that every computer in Europe had sucked Microsoft's "cocaine" and only adored Microsoft's DOS.
The sales of Windows in Europe were also very strong, accounting for 8% of the total income. By 1992, Windows had become as popular as DOS, with monthly sales as high as 1 million copies. This was mainly because Microsoft used methods of giving for free and cutting prices to distribute, threatening computer manufacturers to make them sign a large number of Windows contracts, just as they had to sign Microsoft's DOS under the drive of interests back then.
In Jeff Lan's correspondence, it also recorded the "major negotiation" between Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard. In this negotiation, Microsoft obviously attempted to "substantially increase Hewlett-Packard's DOS royalty".
The lawyers of the Federal Trade Commission flipped through these thrilling confidential documents and kept opening their mouths in surprise, as if the things in front of them were some tales from a thousand and one nights. They noticed that in a Microsoft internal secret communication, Microsoft openly told those computer manufacturers: Unless they sign a DOS contract with Microsoft, they cannot purchase Windows software. Although this forced pre-installation practice was an obvious transaction violating fair competition laws, Microsoft repeatedly mentioned it in the confidential documents.
The person in charge of the Far East Diamond Trading Company, Mike, had received such a letter:
Dear Mike:
I am writing this letter in response to our discussion yesterday. I must further confirm with you that Microsoft cannot sell Windows software alone.
Microsoft can only sell you the combination of Windows and DOS 5.0.
Sincerely
Business Department of Computer OEM Manufacturers
Microsoft Corporation
Everyone in Microsoft knew that their boss Bill Gates hated DR-DOS extremely. He once said that he never wanted to see any manufacturer, especially those in the Far East, using DR-DOS to equip their computers. He repeatedly reduced the price of Microsoft's MS-DOS, willing to risk not making a profit to knock the opponent down. Driven by Gates' strategy, almost all large and small manufacturers in the Far East were fond of Microsoft's DOS products that were almost below cost price.
The sky was gradually darkening, and the gray weather cast a heavy shadow in Washington's heart. Washington stood up, and he seemed to have seen Bill Gates' intention through these messy exchanges of documents marked "Microsoft Confidential". It seemed that Microsoft had been heading towards the path of a monopolist: increasing market share, secretly undermining the rival's sphere of influence, monopolizing the entire market, and then driving up prices. At this time, they could plunder back the money they lost in the price war a thousandfold and a hundredfold.
Although Microsoft repeatedly claimed that they had never done anything against the market because the price of the products sold to consumers by Microsoft had been decreasing. But Washington and his colleagues had already felt that the current price consumers got was not the only standard to measure plunder. Maybe, after Microsoft successfully suppressed the opponent, the price supplied to computer manufacturers would start to increase.
In April 1990, DR-DOS 5.0 was launched, and Gates' all anger was vented. In a few months, all of Microsoft's business teams went out to fight, and almost signed contracts with all computer manufacturers for Microsoft's MS-DOS 5.0, making these manufacturers have no choice but to use DR-DOS 5.0. Gates repeatedly claimed that his product (DOS 5.0) would also be launched in the market in 1990, but in fact, it was not until June 1991 that Microsoft's DOS 5.0 was truly launched.
Washington and his colleagues noticed that since Novell acquired Digital Equipment Corporation a few months ago, Gates' anger burned in every letter sent from his computer. During this period, Novell tried hard to try to get computer manufacturers such as Compaq and IBM to use DR-DOS, but no matter what price it used, it had no chance to get any business because Microsoft's price was always lower than theirs. At the same time, Gates kept complaining to his friend and deputy Ballmer through one email after another that it was because of this hateful DR-DOS that he could not increase the price of Microsoft's software.
"How can we make a profit with DR-DOS?" Gates roared.
Novell's lawyer Bradford and his partners successively handed over many materials to the Federal Trade Commission. In the hallway of the competition bureau office where Washington was located, the evidence materials had piled up higher than his knees. All the materials showed that Microsoft continuously lowered prices to tempt computer manufacturers, and at the same time, Microsoft sold DOS and Windows together and promised to provide the upcoming Workgroup Windows version for free.
There were so many materials from all sides that Washington and his colleagues felt out of breath. "Gates is really an energetic person", he sighed, "He is not only a genius in computer software, but also has the talent to strangle his rivals."
At this time, Lotus' lawyer Berg wrote a letter to the investigator of the Federal Trade Commission, pleading with the Federal Trade Commission to take action against Microsoft's unfair competition practices. He said: "Lotus will fully cooperate with your actions. We will expose how Microsoft violated the US antitrust laws, especially the second part of the Sherman Act."
Berg was most worried that the Federal Trade Commission would ignore Microsoft's current crazy plundering behavior in the application software market. Gates used his power to rapidly take over the market share of each of his rival's best-selling products in the application software market. And when the Federal Trade Commission's long-term investigation was over, there might be no products other than Microsoft in the market.
Berg wrote in the letter: "We believe that any forced action... should be greatly focused on Microsoft's unfair competition practices in the application software and other related product markets (such as spreadsheets, word processing, email, etc.), not only limited to the operating system market (such as DOS)... Those unfair competition practices have not only spread greatly but also strongly harmed the competition and rivals in the related markets. We believe that in the application software market and related software markets, the harm that such unfair competition practices may bring to consumers will be far greater than that in the operating system market."
Every day, the huge "Microsoft Confidential Document" database brings many shocks to Washington and Sicoret. Washington simply didn't know if his mouth that kept involuntarily opening wide could still close when he kept reading like this. As he read, he thought that it seemed that Bill Gates, like every senior programmer of Microsoft, might have some "quite wild" ideas after a few cans of beer. Of course, Gates and ordinary designers thought differently at present. Designers thought about how to design their software, while Bill Gates thought about how to set a trap for his rivals.
It was really a miracle that the lawyers of the Federal Trade Commission had this opportunity to peek into the true face of the world's most profitable enterprise. He found that all the meetings and conversations within Microsoft, including their emails and memos, were quite unrestrained. Sometimes, the lawyers couldn't believe why they could express their will so bluntly, and this will was obviously wrong.
As early as the beginning of this century, Senator Sherman, the founder of the Sherman Act, had distinguished between "attempted monopoly" and "maintaining monopoly status with superior technology". But the lawyers of the Federal Trade Commission found that in Microsoft's confidential documents, there was no place showing that Microsoft was trying to win through "superior technology". On the contrary, their monopoly intention was gradually permeating.
In an email from Jim, the senior vice president of Microsoft, to Gates, discussing the importance of making Novell unable to gain a foothold in the operating system market, the letter directly wrote: "As long as one mistake is made, we will be frustrated in many aspects. This is not as difficult as imagined. If you want to kill someone, you don't need to waste too much effort, and you don't need to get angry. You just need to pull the trigger. No matter how red-faced the discussion was before, it's just a waste of time. We just need to smile and then gently pull the trigger at Novell."
Washington's jaw started to come unhinged again, and he felt that this tone was so much like someone, like who? Was it that German named Hitler?
The pile of documents in front of Washington and his colleagues, and the documents piling up higher and higher in the hallway, were all revealing the wanton illegal acts of a famous big company to these lawyers with rich professional knowledge. And here, they also discovered many strange things that they had not noticed before. These situations were not only shocking but also intolerable.
- Before May 1991, the federal government's antitrust investigation of Microsoft was not made public, but a senior executive of Wenquan Software Company leaked this secret to an analyst on Wall Street. He said that the ins and outs of this matter were heard from Microsoft.
- A colleague of the Federal Trade Commission mentioned an investment report during a meeting with Microsoft's chief lawyer Newcomb. That was all professional secrets. But after a few days, the content discussed that day appeared in newspapers all over the country.
- A reporter called Sicoret and asked him if he was going to expand the scope of the investigation of Microsoft to the entire business methods of Microsoft. Sicoret said that he couldn't disclose the Federal Trade Commission's investigation, which was a well-known discipline. But this reporter told Sicoret that Microsoft had faxed the letters from the Federal Trade Commission to Microsoft to major media.
Washington and Sicoret were very dissatisfied with Microsoft's irresponsible behavior. They found Newcomb and asked him why he leaked the news. All along, the unpublicized investigation would not have a decision until the entire investigation was completed. During this period, it should not be publicized to the media or the outside world. But Newcomb didn't take their questions seriously at all. "It's none of your business." he answered arrogantly.
Now, Washington and Sicoret were reading the emails exchanged between Microsoft's senior executives in September 1991. At this time, it was just before Microsoft released the "Christmas test version" of the primary version of Windows 3.1. According to the letters, Microsoft's senior executives were intensively discussing how to promote this product incompatible with competitors' operating systems.
This was a memo from David Cole, the vice president of Microsoft. This memo was also sent to Jim Silverberg, the senior vice president of Microsoft, and another engineer.
The email read: "We must clearly ensure that Windows 3.1 can only run on MS-DOS or the MS-DOS computer OEM manufacturer version. I have discussed with our legal department. The legal department is drafting a warning text. If someone tries to run Windows on an 'incompatible' operating system, this text will immediately appear on the computer screen. We will let the user still have the option to continue working after the warning text appears. But after a while, we can definitely mess up that computer's system, and all users will find that they must use our operating system, and they have no choice."
Then Cole asked how Microsoft would start to "ensure that Windows is only compatible with MS-DOS".
Silverberg replied: "The guy who sees this warning text may first be very unhappy, and then when he finds a bug, he will be more suspicious that there is a problem with DR-DOS. Then he may go out to buy a copy of MS-DOS, or simply decide not to use the computer anymore."
Next, in the email that Silverberg wrote to Steve Ballmer, he suggested that when Microsoft received a customer's call asking what to do about the error warning message appearing on the computer, Microsoft's employees should tell those customers using DR-DOS: "We only support customers using MS-DOS." Of course, they might also call the manufacturer producing DR-DOS, or we could "add a mild statement during installation... but it doesn't need to appear every time the user starts Windows."
He explained that this "kind" statement should not anger anyone or alarm the media. To deal with the calls from DR-DOS users, it was only necessary to record a paragraph in Microsoft's telephone voice system, such as: If you are not a customer using MS-DOS, press " #" twice. Then, he pointed out that the person who pressed " #" twice could hear a pre-recorded message.
Next, Silverberg and Ballmer discussed the decisive key of the matter, that is, how to lock the customers so that they always only use Microsoft's MS-DOS. He wrote: "Judging from the development of the situation, the wisest choice is to continue to establish the dependence of Windows on MS-DOS."
This last sentence was exactly the core of the whole incident. "Continuing to establish the dependence of Windows on MS-DOS" itself was monopoly.
Wengier - 新DOS时代
欢迎大家来到我的“新DOS时代”网站,里面有各类DOS软件和资料,地址:
http://wendos.mycool.net/
E-Mail & MSN: wengierwu AT hotmail.com (最近比较忙,有事请联系DOSroot和雨露,谢谢!)

欢迎大家来到我的“新DOS时代”网站,里面有各类DOS软件和资料,地址:
http://wendos.mycool.net/
E-Mail & MSN: wengierwu AT hotmail.com (最近比较忙,有事请联系DOSroot和雨露,谢谢!)



